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ABSTRACT
Thispaper assesses the quantitative effects of a shift to monetary
restraint in the Tjnited States on the DM—$ exchange rate and the German
economy. The results indicate that such effects are large. If Germany
keeps its money growth unchanged, it will tend to experience a sharp and
sustained depreciation of the deutsche mark and a significant increase in
inflation and in unemployment. If it adopts an equivalent policy of monetary
restraint, it will tend to benefit from a marked decline in inflation, but
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This paper assesses the quantitative importance of the effects of a
shift to a policy of monetary restraint in the United States on the DM—$
exchange rate and the German economy. The paper was motivated by events
In 1979—81, when a shift toward monetary restraint in the United States
was accompanied by a sharp rise in U.S. interest rates and in the
exchange rate of the U.S. dollar. This sharp rise is widely viewed as
having placed pressures on other industrial countries, in particular
Germany, to boost their interest rates in order to limit the depreciation
of their currencies. However, there is much uncertainty as to exactly
how much U.S. monetary restraint contributed to the appreciation of the
U.S. dollar. There is also much uncertainty as to the magnitude of the
effects of the depreciation of the other currencies on their corresponding
economies, and, therefore, on the degree of constraint imposed on other
national authorities by the U.S. policy of monetary restraint. Finally,
there is much uncertainty as to the costs and advantages of the decision
made by other countries to largely match the rise in U.S. interest rates
by a rise in their own interest rates. The present paper aims at clari-
fying these issues, at least with respect to Germany.
Beyond these specific policy issues, the paper also aims at casting
some light on a number of theoretical and empirical issues concerning the
functioning and the interdependence of industrial countries under floating
exchange rates. In the area of wage and price formation, the main issues
considered in the paper concern the formation of price expectations, the
effect of wage and price long—term contracts, and the effect of variations—2—
in import prices. More specifically, the paper addresses itself to the
following questions. Do private market participants form their price
expectations on the basis of past price developments or do they directly
take into account information that they have on the monetary policy
stance of the authorities? How fast can changes in price expectations be
reflected in actual wages and prices, given the existence of long—term
wage and price contracts? Are changes in import prices reflected in
wages and prices of domestically produced goods, either because of wage
indexation or because of the effect of import prices on price expectations?
In the area of interest rate and output determination, the main
issue concerns the effect of monetary policy on interest rates. The cru-
cial question here is whether a reduction in money growth rapidly leads
to a decrease in interest rates because of reduced inflationary expecta-
tions, or whether it may in fact lead to an increase in interest rates
for a sustained period of time because of a liquidity squeeze. The
liquidity squeeze could result from the persistence of inflation either
because monetary restraint has no effect on price expectations or because
long—term contracts prevent wages and prices from adjusting rapidly.
Thus, the interest rate issue is closely related to the price formation
issue. It also has direct implications as far as output is concerned,
because an increase in interest rates at a time when inflationary expec-
tations are constant or declining will lead to a reduction in the demand
for investment goods and consumer durables and, ultimately, to a decline
in overall output.—3—
These various theoretical and empirical issues have further impli-
cations as far as the exchange rate determination pràcess is concerned.
If interest rates rise in real terms, and a fortiori in nominal terms, as
a result of a reduction in money growth, the exchange rate may initially
shoot upward as a result of the rise in the uncovered interest—rate dif-
ferentials. If output declines, the current account surplus may gradually
increase, possibly causing a further appreciation of the exchange rate.
The first overshooting effect depends on how persistent the rise in
interest rates is expected to be. The second overshooting effect depends
both on whether the substitution among assets denominated in different
currencies is small and on whether private market participants view new
data on the current account balance as containing new information on
where the real exchange rate will have to be in the longer run to yield a
"reasonable" current balance outturn. The paper examines how large these
overshooting effects are and how they may affect domestic inflation.
To deal with these issues, the paper uses a model of a monetary
economy developed in Artus (1981). Section I briefly reviews the main
characteristics of this model. Section II presents the results of the
estimation of the parameters of this model for Germany from data through
the second quarter of 1981. One of the main findings, consistent pith
results of a number of previous studies, is that the DM/$ exchange rate
is quite sensitive to changes in uncovered interest—rate differentials
and to inflation rate differentials and current balance developments. A
shift to monetary restraint in the United States will influence all these
variables and, therefore, the DM—$ exchange rate. Nevertheless, only a—4—
small part of the depreciation of the deutsche mark vis——vis the U.S.
dollar in the course of 1980 and the first two quarters of 1981 can be
explained by the effects of U.S. monetary restraint. A large residual
remains that is called the "Reagan effect" in the present paper, for
lack of a better name.
Section III presents the results of five simulations made with the
model. The first three simulations concern the effects of U.S. monetary
restraint on Germany. The first simulation assumes that neither the Ger-
man monetary authorities nor the monetary authorities of other industrial
countries change their policies to counter the tendency toward a depre-
ciation of their exchange rates vis——vis the U.S. dollar. The second
simulation assumes that the German monetary authorities do not change
their policies, while the monetary authorities of other industrial coun-
tries change their policies to offset the effect of U.S. monetary re—
straint on their exchange rates vis—â--vis the U.S. dollar. The third
simulation assumes that both the German monetary authorities and the
monetary authorities of other industrial countries change their monetary
policies. In the next two simulations, the consequences of the Reagan
effect on Germany are simulated under the assumption that neither Germany
nor other industrial countries change their monetary policies, then under
the assumption that they all shift to a policy of monetary restraint to
offset the consequences of the Reagan effect on their exchange rates.
Finally, Section IV summarizes some of the conclusions that can be
drawn from this study with respect to international economic inter-
dependence under floating exchange rates.—5—
I. The Model
The model developed in Artus (1981) and used in this paper with a
few modifications is composed of three blocks of equations: a price
block, an output block, and an exchange rate block. The equations are
reproduced in Table 1 and described briefly below.
The price block differentiates between short—run inflationary expec-
tations (for the next quarter) and long—run inflationary expectations
(for the next year and a half). Short—run inflationary expectations are
assumed to be formed on the basis of recent inflationary developments,
while long—run inflationary expectations are assumed to reflect the long—
run expected rate of growth of money (for the next year and a half). The
assumption underlying this specification is that, in the short run, the
relation between money and prices is too tenuous to yield efficient fore-
casts; private market participants can do better by extrapolating recent
inflationary developments. However, in the long run, the amount of money
and the overall price level are clearly related and it makes sense to
accept the view that inflationary expectations reflect the monetary
policy stance of the authorities, as it is perceived by private market
participants.
1
It -is the long—run expected rate of inflation that enters the
Phillips curve equation. Furthermore, it does so in the form of a
distributed lag. The assumption is that participants in labor markets
enter into long—run contractual wage arrangements that specify the rate
of increase of money wage rates. In each quarter, the arrangements being
entered into reflect the expected long—run rate of inflation prevailingPrice blockb
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(continuad on p. 7)—7—.
Table 1 (continued). Model of a Monetary Economy'
List of Variables
Endogenous variables: b, e, ,iL,js eP.d' es $,
x,,y.
Exogenous variables: bus, g, ius,m, â'PUSPm t,yy,
y*, z2.
Notation
b =currentbalance defined as the ratio of exports of goods and
services over imports of goods and services
e nominal exchange rate (value of one deutsche mark In terms of
U.S. Cents)
g =realgovernment expenditures
=long—terminterest rate (yield on Industrial bonds outstanding)
=short—terminterest rate (3—month deposits in local money market)
m =basemoney adjusted for changes in reserve requirements
p =domesticdemand deflator
Pd GDP deflator
Pm =deflatorof import of goods and services (in U.S. dollars)
r change in net foreign assets component of base money scaled by
the proportion of base money accounted for by the net foreign
asset component in the previous period
t =timetrend.
x =ratioof the volume of exports of goods and services to the
volume of imports cf goods and services.
y =GDP(real ternis)
(continued on p. 8)—8—
Table 1 (concluded). Model of a Monetary Economy a
=potentialGDP (real terms)
z, Z2 dummy variables for announced changes in the stance of monetary
policy (see text)
All variables denoted by small letters are in logs, except for the
interest rates (iS and i2-), the change in foreign assets (r), and the
dummy variables (z1 and z2).
The various signs must be interpreted as follows: a dot ()denotes
the rate of change of the variable (i.e., m =m—
m...1,with m and m
logs); a delta (Li) signifies that the variable is considered in first—
difference terms (i.e., ti =— 'i);a superscript (e9.) denotes the
long—run expected value of the variable (i.e., e2.. =therate of growth
of money expected to prevail on average from period t to period t + 6 at
the time of period t); a superscript (es) denotes the short—run expected
values of the variable (i.e., es =rateof increase of domestic demand
deflator expected to prevail from period t to period t + 1 at the time
of period t; a tilde ()signifiesthat the variable is expressed in
terms of deviation from an average of past values; and, finally, an aste-
risk (*) signifies that the variable refers to the industrial world, minus
the Federal Republic of Germany, while a subscript U.S. signifies that
the variable refers to the United States.' All variables are expressed in
deutsche mark, except fo,r the deflator of imports (Pm) and the variables
referring to the rest of the Industrial world or to the United States that
are expressed In U.S. dollars.
be coefficents of equation (1) are to be derived by estimating the
coefficients of







while the coefficients of equations (3) and (4) are to be derived, respec-









Therefore, in any given quarter, the increase in the
average money wage rate for the whole economy reflects an average of the
expected long—run rates of inflation prevailing in a number of past quar-
ters. The behavior of the GDP deflator is assumed to follow the behavior
of the average money wage rate. The important consequence of that speci-
fication is that, even if an unexpected policy change is immediately
reflected in a change in money growth expectations, it will only lead to
a gradual change in the actual rate of inflation.
From an empirical standpoint, the difficulty is to find a proxy for
the long—run expected rate of growth of money. The standard procedure to
derive estimates for the expected rate of growth of money is to assume
that the monetary authorities react with a lag to values taken by certain
target variables, such as the GDP gap. In each period, the parameters of
the policy reaction function can be estimated from the use of past ol?ser—
vations on the relevant target variables. The estimates are then used to
calculate a proxy for the expected rate of growth of money for the next
3
period on the basis of past and present values of the target variables.
This method is employed in the present model with two important modifica-
tions. The first modification is that the policy reaction function (equa-
tion (1') in footnote a of Table 1) aims at explaining the average rate
of growth of money over overlapping six—quarter periods. This modifica-
tion is needed because the proxy that is sought is for the long—run rate
of growth of money (over the next year and a half).
The second modification is that two variables that are concurrent
with the money growth being explained are introduced in the policy reac-
tion function. The first variable (z1) is a dummythatidentifies the— 11)—
changein the rate of growth of money that tends to follow the announCe
ment of a major discretionary policy change. The effect of the
announcement on money growth expectations in equation (1) of Table 1 is
then related to the magnitude of the actual change in the rate of money
growth that tended to follow similar announcements in the past. The
second concurrent variable introduced in the policy reaction function is
the amount of foreign exchange market intervention. In calculating the
expected rate of growth of money, it is then assumed that private market
participants do not anticipate the money growth that results from foreign
exchange market intervention because of the erratic nature of this
intervention so that this latter variable can be ignored. In brief,
variations in money growth related to exchange market intervention are
considered to be unanticipated. The introduction of these two concurrent
variables into the policy reaction function allows for a better identi-
fication of the unanticipated component of money growth and helps to
alleviate some of the identification problems that arise in the estirna—
tion of the model.
The output block assumes that, given a certain level of potential
output, the long—term real interest rate and the impulse coming fromreal
government expenditures and foreign trade determine actual output. The
interest—rate effect on output is expected to take place with a substan-
tial lag because investment reacts slowly. It takes time to decide upon
and plan capital projects, and it is costly to stop them before completion.
The effect of the impulse coming from real government expenditures and
foreign trade is expected to take place more rapidly because no similar— 11—
lagsare involved. At the same time, the model assumes that the effect
of this impulse is temporary. Both real government expenditures and the
ratio of exports over imports (in volume terms) are introduced in the
form of deviations from past tendencies, so that any increase in the rate
of growth of these variables has first a positive impulse effect on output
growth, and then a negative effect of equal magnitude spread over time.
The long—run expected rate of inflation having already been deter-
mined, the determination of the long—term real interest rate requires only
the specification of an equation for the long—term nominal interest rate.
This is done by inverting a demand for money equation in which the long—
term rate of interest represents the opportunity cost of holding money.
In the resulting equation (7), it is expected that a lower real money
stock leads, by itself, to a higher nominal interest rate, while the sign
of the coefficient of the expected long—run inflation term is indetermi-
nate.
6
The last term in equation (7) represents an expected liquidity
squeeze or glut, which should have a positive coefficient. As explained
in Artus (1981), when a shift to monetary restraint leads to a downward
shift in the long—run expected rate of growth of money, the slow speed
of price adjustment will lead private market participants to expect that
the real money stock is going to decline. The excess of the short—run
over the long—run expected inflation rate will indicate how severe the
liquidity squeeze is likely to become in forthcoming quarters. If this
excess is large, private market participants will bid up the interest
rate in anticipation of the forthcoming squeeze.— 12—
Theexchange rate block is based on the asset—market theory of
exchange rate determination. In the equation that explains the change in
the DM—$ exchange rate, the three explanatory variables are the expected
inflation rate differential, the change in the uncovered short—term
interest rate differential, and the relative current balance position of
Germany and the United States. A derivation of this equation was
presented in Artus (1981, Appendix I). One of the results of the deri-
vation was that the introduction of the relative current balance position
could be justified on two grounds. First, the substitutability of domes-
tic and foreign securities may be limited. For example, if Germany has
a large current balance deficit, the spot value of the deutsche mark vis—
a—vis foreign currencies may have to decline in comparison with its
expected future value in order to induce private market participants
abroad to increase the share of the deutsche—mark denominated securities
in their portfolios. Second, private market participants may view new
data on the current balance as containing new information as to where the
exchange rate should be in the future and, therefore, because of interest—
rate arbitrage, where it should be in the present.
8
To complete the exchange rate block, it remains to determine the
short—term interest rate and the current balance. The short—term inter-
est rate is determined by specifying an equation for the term structure
of interest rate. In this equation, the excess of the short—term inter-
est rate over the long—term interest rate is related to a constant, the
real money stock, the real GDP, and the excess of the short—run expected
rate of inflation over the long—run expected rate of inflation. The— 13—
constantmeasures the liquidity premium and is expected to be negative.
The current balance is determined by relating the ratio of exports over
imports (in volume terms) to relative real GDP levels and relative GDP
deflators in Germany and in the rest of industrial countries. For sim-
plification purposes, the German GD? deflator is taken as a proxy for the
deflator of German exports expressed in deutsche mark, while the deflator
of German imports expressed in U.s. dollars is taken as exogenous.
II. Econometric Results
Table 2 presents the regression results obtained by using quarterly
observations and two—stage—least--squares regression methods to estimate
the parameters of the model. The estimation period extends from the
third quarter of 1964 to the second quarter of 1981. Two exceptions are
equations (1'), (3') and (4'), which were estimated for each quarter t
using observations on the period extending from the first quarter of 1955
to t,
10
and equations (7), (11), and (12), which were estimated from
observations on the floating rate period extending from the fourth quar-
ter of 1973 to the second quarter of 1981. On the whole, the results
were similar to those obtained in Artus (1981) for periods with identi-
cal starting points, but ending in the fourth quarter of 1979. However,
there were important differences that will be stressed below.
In the price block, the results obtained for the equations that are
used to estimate proxies for inflationary expectations remained similar to
those obtained previously. In brief, long—run money growth expectations,
and therefore long—run inflationary expectations, are deemed to adjust
slowly to actual changes in the rate of growth of money, but they alsoPrice block
— 14—
a
Table 2. Ernpirical Results



















































































Mean lag 3.061 (0.641)Table 2 (continued).
— 15—
EmpiricalResults a
(6) =0.726d +0.274Pm —
Outputblock
+ 0.0092d1 Z a10,(y-)_
(0.0021)
(7) i =—0.0025—0.0654(m-p) +0.0569y —0.084p —0.00006t
(0.0696)(0.0163) (0.0203) (0.124) (0.00013)
+0.190(es —eL)
(0.127)
= 0.879 SEE =0.0014 D—W =0.992
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(11) =ies—esd — 0.0395+ 1.371 (S—
(0.0103)(0.822)
+ 2.406 (1SjS + 0.243((bbus) +(b_bs)...i)I2
(0.797) (0.054)
—0.027d3 —:0.062 d4 —0.065d5
(0.010) (0.022) (0.019)— 17—
Table2 (concluded). Empirical Resuitsa
(12) is i —0.3641—0.0188(m—p) + 0.0826 y + 0.258 (ese2)
(0.0491) (0.0158) (0.0204) (0.084)
—2R =0.815SEE =0.0012D—W =1.714RHO= 0.498
x =0.6166—1.585(y) + 0.952 (y*_*) —z
(0.1024)(0.308) (0.163)
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a34,1 =—0.144 a34,10 =—0.081
a34,'2 =—0.087 34,11 =—0.093
cX34,3 =—0.050 34,12 =—0.098
a34,4 =—0.029 34,13—0.093
—0.021 34,14 =—0.075
°34,6 =—0.024 34,15 =—0.042
a34,7 —0.034 34,16—0.010 —2
34 8 —0.049 R =0.634
Total =—1.198(0.258) SEE =0.0351
Mean lag 6.509 (2.095) D—W =1.331
(14) bx+pd—p+e
The period covered by the left—hand—side variables extends from the
third quarter of 1964 to the second quarter of 1981, except for equations
(1'), (3'), (4'), (7), (11) and (12). As explained in the text, the
parameters of equations (1'), (3'), and (4'), are estimated for each period
t on the basis of observations for the period extending from the first
quarter of 1955 to t. To save space, the results are presented here only
for the regression equations covering the period extending from the first
quarter of 1955 to the second quarter of 1981. The parameters of equations
(7), (11) -and (12) are estimates from observations on the flexible exchange
rate period extending from the fourth quarter of 1973 to the second
quarter of 1981. Standard errors of the estimated values of the parameters
are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. SEE denotes standard error
of the estimate. D.W. denotes the Durbin—Watson statistic. Columns may
not add to totals shown because of rounding.
—0.05 from 1976 to 1979.
/dmonconstraint:polynomial of degree 3, without zero—constraint.
eAlinon constraint: polynomial of degree 3, zero—constraint at the end.
Almonconstraint:polynomial of degree 3, zero—contraints at the
beginning and end.— 18—
aredeemed to be directly influenced by announcements of major policy
changes. Short—run inflationary expectations are deemed to adjust slowly
to actual changes in inflation rates.
The results for the Phillips curve equations are also similar to
those obtained previously. In particular, the sum of the coefficients on
the expectation term is not significantly different from one, but a large
part of the effect comes with a significant lag. It takes about five
quarters for the total effect to take place, which is consistent with the
a priori knowledge that most labor contracts in Germany cover a period of
one year. Similarly, it takes a long time for the output gap to affect
the rate of inflation. Furthermore, [a this case, even the final effect
is not large. Ultimately, an increase of 1 percentage point in the gap
between actual and potential GDP reduces the quarterly rate of inflation
by a 0.17 (0.05) percentage point, or the annual rate by about a 0.68
(0.20) percentage point. As in Artus (1981), variables outside the mone-
tary field had to be introduced into the regression equation to account
for certain developments. The surge of inflation in 1968—71 is still
explained by introducing a dummy variable of the zero—one type. However,
contrary to that previous study, the surge of inflation in 1973—75 is not
explained anymore by the introduction of a dummy variable. Instead, a
variable measuring the average change in import prices during the pre-
ceding six quarters performs that function. The introduction of import
prices had not been successful previously, possibly because, except for
1973—75, import prices in deutsche marks were not increasing rapidly
during the sample period. It is only when introducing 1980 and the first— 19—
halfof 1981, which was characterized by rapidly increasing
in deutsche marks, that the coefficient of the import price
became relatively large and statistically significant.
12
These results suggest that German real wage rates are somewhat
rigid.13 For example, a 10per cent deterioration in the terms of
trade due to an increase in import prices will lead to a 2.5 per cent
increase in the GDP deflator, presumably because of an increase in nomi-
nal wage rates. Given a constant money growth rate, the growth of real
GDP will start to decline. But, for many years, the resulting rise in
the output gap will fail to bring about the decline in real wage rates
necessary to restore domestic equilibrium at full employment.
In the output block, the addition of observations for 1980 and the
first half of 1981 allows a better identification of the effects of
changes in the real money stock on the long—term rate of interest. The
coefficient of the real money stock, contrary to previous results, is now
statistically significant and is large in magnitude. A 1 per cent reduc-
tion in the real money stock is found to lead to an increase of a 0.065
percentage point in the long—term interest rate at a quarterly rate, or
a 0.26 percentage point at an annual rate.
14
The other results in the
long—term interest rate equation remained unchanged. In particular, the
coefficient of the long—run expected rate of inflation is small and not
statistically significant. The coefficient of the expected liquidity—
squeeze variable is positive as expected, but also not statistically
significant. Together, the two latter coefficients imply that a
import prices
variable— 20—
1percentage point decrease in the long—run expected inflation rate ini-
tially leads to a 0.27 percentage point increase in the long—term nominal
interest rate and, therefore, to a 1.27 percentage point increase in the
long—term real interest rate.
The results for the output equation were not affected by the updating.
The long—term real interest rate is still found to have a gradual, but
ultimately large, effect on output. After three and one—half years, an
increase in the interest rate of 1 percentage point at a quarterly rate
(or 4 percentage points at an annual rate) is found to result in a 7.2
per cent decline in real GDP. By contrast, the impulse effect of an
additional 1 per cent increase in real government expenditures and in
the ratio of exportsover imports in volume terms leads to a 0.33 (0.05)
per cent increase in real GD? after two quarters, while government expen-
ditures and exports per se account for about 45 per cent of GD?.
In the exchange rate block, the coefficients of the exchange rate
equation were first estimated without making any attempt to isolate the
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While the estimates of the coefficients have the expected signs and
are statistically significant, the regression equation explains only 51
per cent of the variations in the exchange rate. The plot of actual and
= 0.509 SEE =0.0336— 21—
estimatedvalues presented in Chart LA clearly shows that the large
residuals are to be found in three periods, which follow the oil embargo
in late 1973, the collapse of the Herstatt bank in mid—1974, and the
election of Ronald Reagan in late 1980.
15
When dummy variables were
included for these factors,
16
Table 2 show that the estimates of the
coefficients were not significantly affected, but that their standard
errors were greatly reduced. The explanatory power of the equation
increased sharply, with 73 per cent of the variations in the exchange
rate now accounted for. (See Chart 1.B for the residuals in the new
regression equation.) The results of this latter equation will be used
in the rest of this study; they are roughly similar to those obtained in
Artus (1981) as far as interest rate and current balance effects are
concerned.
The interesting implication of these results is that about half of the
29 per cent depreciation of the deutsche mark against the U.S. dollar from
the fourth quarter of 1979 to the second quarter of 1981 is due to what
we have called the "Reagan effect" (see Chart 2). The other significant
factor during this period is the worsening of the German current balance
relative to the U.S. current balance. Contrary to what is commonly
thought,-changes in interest rates do not account for much of the net
change in the exchange rate from the fourth quarter of 1979 to the second
quarter of 1981, mainly because, the rise in U.S. real interest rates was
soon offset by an equivalent rise in German interest rates. But the
pattern of quarterly changes in the DM—$ exchange rate was strongly
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Theresults for the two remaining regression equations in the
exchange rate block call for only brief comments. The results of the
equation for the short—term interest rate are reasonable. There is a
significant liquidity premium indicated by the negative constant. As
expected, an increase In the real money stock decreases the short—term
rate by comparison with the long—term rate, while an increase in econo-
mic activity Increases the short—term rate by comparison with the long--
term rate. An excess of the short—run expected rate of inflation over
the long—run expected rate of inflation is reflected by an excess of the
short—term interest rate over the long—term interest rate. Finally, the
trade equation remains characterized, as previously, by a sum of the
export and import price elasticities that exceeds one only after a lag
of about three years.
III. Policy Simulations
The model estimated above can be used to investigate various policy
issues. Here, I focus on issues of international interdependence. First,
I Investigate the normal effects of a shift to monetary restraint in the
United States on the DM—$ exchange rate and the German economy, and the
policy alternatives available to the German monetary authorities. Then,
I consider the different case of an exogenous" change in the DM—$
exchange rate, taking as an example the Reagan effect, and again I inves-
tigate the effects on the German economy and the policy alternatives
available to the German monetary authorities.
1.Effects of monetary restraint in the United States
The purpose of the first set of simulations is to estimate the
effects of a shift to monetary restraint in the United States on the DM—$— 23—
exchangerate and the German economy, when the German monetary authorities
do not change their rate of money growth in response to the change in U.S.
policy. The estimation is made under two polar assumptions as to the
policy response in other industrial countries. Under assumption A, the
other industrial countries keep their real exchange rates vis—a—vis the
deutsche mark constant and, therefore, follow the German monetary policy.
Under assumption B, the other industrial countries keep their real exchange
rates vis—à—vis the U.S. dollar constant and, therefore, follow the U.S.
monetary policy. To make the estimation, I generate a control solution
for the period 1980 to 1984 which, although somewhat arbitrary, is intended
to provide a plausible picture of what would have taken place during this
period if there had not been a shift in U.S. monetary policy and a Reagan
effect. Then, I "shock" the model by changing the exogenous variables
and I calculate the effect of the given shock by subtracting the new
simulation results from those obtained in the control solution.
The shock that depicts the shift to monetary restraint in the United
States is represented in Chart 3. The short—term interest rate (at a
quarterly rate) is increased by one percentage point in the first quarter,
stajs at its new level for one and a half year, and then declines back to
its initial level in four quarters. The U.S. inflation rate (at a quar-
terly rate) declines gradually, with a total decline of one percentage
point after two and a half years. The rate of growth of real GNP (at a
quarterly rate) is reduced by one percentage point in the first quarter,
stays at its new level for two years, goes back to its initial level for
two quarters, and then increases by one percentage point for two years,— 23a —
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beforefinally settling back to its initial level. The U.S. current
balance (expressed by the ratio of exports of goods and services over
imports of goods and services) increases gradually during the first two
years for a total gain of 10 per cent, stays at its new level for two
quarters, then gradually goes back to its initial level during the next
two years. The choice of these adjustment paths is arbitrary, but it
would not be unrealistic to view them as representing the effects of
the shift of monetary restraint in the United States in late 1979 in a
schematic form. At least this is true if one neglects the sharp quar-
terly movements in U.S. money growth and U.S. interest rates during 1980.
Chart 4 depicts the estimates of the effects of the shift in U.S.
monetary policy on the DM—$ exchange rate and the German economy, when
the German monetary authorities do not change their rate of money growth.
The estimates on the left—hand side assume that the rest of the industrial
countries keep their real exchange rates vis—à—vis the deutsche mark
constant (assumption A), while the estimates on the right—hand side assume
that the rest of the industrial countries keep their real exchange vis——
vis the U.S. dollar constant (assumption B).
Considering assumption A first, the effects on the DM—$ exchange
rate and the German economy are quite pronounced. Three main factors
cause the deutsche mark to depreciate sharply in real terms against the
U.S. dollar for a sustained period. First, the increase in short—term
U.S. interest rates leads to a sharp depreciation of the DM—$ exchange
rate during the first two quarters. Second, this initial depreciation
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duringthe next few quarters. Third, the decline in economic activity
In the United States gradually leads to an improvement in the U.S. cur-
rent balance and a further worsening of the German current balance.
After three years, the DM—$ exchange rate has declined by 27 per cent in
nominal terms and 20 per cent in real terms. The depreciation of the
DM—$ exchange rate, in turn, causes a rise in the German inflation rate,
as measured both by the CDP deflator and the domestic demand deflator.
After three years, the GDP deflator has increased by 1.2 per cent and
the domestic demand deflator by 2.9 per cent. With an unchanged rate of
money growth, real interest rates increase In Germany, bringing about a
small increase in the GDP gap. All these effects become unwound in the
long run, but it takes a large number of years at some cost in terms of
cumulated lost output in Germany. The cumulated lost output in Germany
accounts for 0.5 per cent of a year's GDP already after three years and
1.5 per cent after five years.
Not surprisingly, the effects under assumption B are similar as to
their direction, but their magnitude is larger. For example, the rise
in the German inflation rate is much larger as a result of a larger rise
in import prices. After three years, the GDP deflator has risen by
nearly 4.0 per cent and the domestic demand deflator by nearly 9.9 per
cent. This leads to a larger cumulated lost output in Germany; the lost
output amounts to 2.2 per cent of a year's GDP after three years and 5.4
per cent after five years. These results illustrate how much Germany
benefits if other industrial countries keep their real exchange rates
vis—â—vis the deutsche mark constant.— 26—
Apossible policy response of the German monetary authoritiesis to
reduce their rate of money growth in order to offset the effect of U.S.
monetary restraint on the DM—$ exchange rate.
17
The Implications of
this policy response are depicted in Chart 5 for the case whereother
industrial countries adopt the same response.
18
The favorable effect of
such a response is that the rate of inflation declines sharply in Cermany.
After a year, the rate of inflation has declined by about one percentage
point (at a quarterly rate), whether the rate ofinflation Is measured
by the GDP deflator or the domestic demand deflator. Furthermore,this
decline in the rate of inflation persists in subsequent years as aresult
of a permanent decline in the rate of money growth in Germany. How-
ever, the cost of such a policy is extremely largein terms of lost out—
put in Germany. The output gap increases gradually to reach about eight
percentage points after two years, before declining slowly. Bythe end
of the fifth year, the cumulated lost output accounts for 21.5 per cent
of a year's GDP. This can be compared to the cumulated loss of 1.5 per
cent in the case where neither Germany nor the other industrialcountries
respond to the shift in U.S. monetary policy by an equivalentshift in
their own monetary policies.
2.Changes generated by the Reagan effect
To estimate the changes in the German economy generated by a
development such as the Reagan effect, I have simulated themodel after
introduction of an exogenous shift in the value of the deutsche mark
against the U.S. dollar of —6.5 per cent per quarterfrom the fifth to
the sixth quarter of the simulation period. For simplification purposes,CH.\RT 5
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ithas been assumed that economic activity, inflation and the current
balance in the United States remain as in the control solution. Differ—
ences between the new simulation results and those obtained in the control
solution are presented in Chart 6. The results on the left—hand side of
the chart assume that the German monetary authorities do not change the
rate of money growth, while the results on the right—hand side assume
that the authorities reduce the rate of money growth in order to offset
the Reagan effect on the DM—$ exchange rate. In both cases, the other
industrial countries are assumed to follow monetary policies that keep
their exchange rates vis—à—vis the deutsche mark constant in real
19
terms.
The left—hand side results clearly indicate the inflationary impact
of a depreciation of the DM—$ exchange rate on the German economy. The
rate of inflation measured by the domestic demand deflator increases by
more than half a percentage point at a quarterly rate during the first
two quarters. After about two and a half years, the cumulated effect on
the domestic demand deflator reaches 2 1/2 per cent. The rate of infla-
tion measured by the GDP deflator is less affected; the cumulated effect
on the GD? after two years and a half Is about 1 1/2 per cent. In part,
the inflationary consequences of the Reagan effect are enhanced because
the depreciation of the deutsche mark initially leads to a worsening of
the German current balance, which results in a further depreciation.
This mechanism maintains the downward pressure on the deutsche mark even
after the two quarters of the Reagan effect. With an unchanged rate of— 27a—
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moneygrowth, the increase in the domestic demand deflator gradually
brings about a liquidity squeeze and a rise in both short—term and long—
term real interest rates. The recessionary effect on output of the rise
in long—term interest rates is at first offset by the expansionary effect
coming from the increase in the ratio of exports over imports in volume
terms, but, after one year, the recessionary effect starts to dominate.
These effects become unwound in the long run, but at a cost. Because
of the increase in the output gap, the rate of inflation, measured either
by the GD? deflator or the domestic demand deflator, starts falling in
comparison with the control solution. A gradual improvement in the cur-
rent account, resulting from the lagged relative price effects and the
increase in the GDP gap, stops the depreciation of the deutsche mark in
time, and then leads to a gradual appreciation. However, it takes a long
period of economic slack before the price increases of the first two and
a half years are fully offset by subsequent price declines. Five years
after the initial shock, the cumulated effect on the domestic demand
deflator still amounts to an increase of 2 per cent, which is only 1/2
per cent less than after two and a half years, despite anadditional
output gap of about half a percentage point maintained continuously from
the third year onward.
The alternative strategy for the German monetary authorities and the
monetary authorities of other industrial countries is to shift to a policy
of monetary restraint in order to offset the effect of the exogenous
development that puts downward pressure on their exchange rates. However,— 29—
theresults presented on the right—hand side of Chart 6 indicate that, at
times, the cost in terms of economic slack may be so large that this will
not be a realistic alternative. In the case of the Reagan effect, the
model indicates that the German monetary authorities would have had to
reduce the rate of monetary growth by about seven percentage points in
each of the two quarters directly affected to offset the Reagan effect
on the DM—$ exchange rate. Not surprisingly, the model indicates that
this would have led not only to a reduction in inflation in Germany, as
measured by both the domestic demand deflator and the GDP deflator, but
also to a major recession. After two years, the output gap would have
been increased by about 8 1/2 percentage points. Then, the German mone-
tary authorities would have had to carry out a major monetary expansion
to offset the upward pressures on the DM—$ exchange rate that would
have resulted from a sharp increase in the German current balance. This
would, in turn, have lead to a sharp economic recovery.
IV. Conclusions
This paper indicates that a shift to a policy of monetary restraint
in the United States has major effects on Germany. If the German mone-
tary authorities keep their rate of money growth unchanged, they will
experience a sharp and sustained depreciation of the deutsche mark against
the U.S. dollar in real terms. This will lead to a significant increase
in the inflation rate in Germany for a large number of years. The CD?
gap will also increase gradually. The magnitude of these effects is
greatly increased when other industrial countries choose to respond to
the U.S. policy by adopting equivalent policies of monetary restraint.— 30—
Inthis latter case, a simulation based on a schematic description of
the effects of the 1979 shift to monetary restraint in the United States
on U.S. interest rates, prices, output, and current balances, indicates
the following effects on the German economy. Prices increase substan—
tially in Germany; after three years, the GDP deflator is nearly 4 per
cent higher than in the control solution corresponding to no shift to
monetary restraint in the United States, and the domestic demand deflator
nearly 10 per cent higher. Furthermore, output decreases substantially
in Germany by comparison with the control solution. The cumulated lost
output amounts to 2.2 per cent of a year's GDP after three years and 5.4
per cent after five years. It is true that all these effects become
unwound in the long run, but the long run seems so far away in this case
as to be irrelevant.
If the German monetary authorities respond to the change in U.S.
policy by adopting an equivalent policy of monetary restraint and other
industrial countries follow suit, Germany benefits from a marked decline
in its inflation rate, but the cost in terms of lost output is extremely
large. After a year, the rate of inflation, in terms of the GDP deflator
or domestic demand deflator has declined by about one percentage point
(at a quarterly rate), and the lower level persists in subsequent years.
The output gap increases gradually to reach about eight percentage points
after two years, before declining slowly. By the end of the fifth year,
the cumulated lost output accounts for 21.5 per cent of a year's GDP.
An appreciation of the U.S. dollar due to an exogenous development
gives rise to a similar dilemma for the German monetary authorities.— 31—
Hereagain, the dilemma is increased when other industrialcountries
choose to change their monetary policies in order to stabilize their
exchange rates vis—à—vis the U.S. dollar.If the exogenous development
is as large as what is called in the present paper the Reagan effect,
that is, a depreciation of about 13 per cent within two quarters, the
analysis indicates that it would be very costly for the German monetary
authorities to try to offset the impact of this development on their
exchange rate through a policy of monetary restraint. The necessary
reduction In money growth would push the German economy into a major
recession.
This paper also indicates that the large effects on the German
economy of a U.S. policy of monetary restraint orof an exogenous devel--
opment affecting the DM—$ exchange rate are mainlydue to the following
factors: (1) the inflation rate in Germany responds slowly to a change
in the money growth rate or the emergence of a GDP gap, (2) there is a
direct link in Germany between import prices and domestic factor prices,
(3) the DM—$ exchange rate is highly sensitive to variationsin uncovered
short—term interest rate differentials and to the level of therelative
current balance position of the two countries, and (4) thevolumes of
German foreign trade flows respond slowly to relative price changes.J.R. Artus
—32-
APPENDIX
Dummy Variables z1 and z2
The dummy variables z1 and z2 represent the discretionary component






If the rate of growth of money on the left—hand side of the equation
covers a period that includes the beginning of the implementatIon of a
major stabilization program, then its value may deviate substantially
from the value that the first two explanatory variables would normally
imply. To take this into account, the dummy variable z1 is given a value
that increases from zero to one in proportion to the number of quarters
covered by the left—hand side variable that are affected by the policy
shift. If the left—hand side variable covers a period that immediately
follows a policy change, only one or two of the lagged money growth rates
included as explanatory variables will be affected by the policy change,
so that the historical series cannot be considered to reflect adequately
the information available to private market participants. To offset
this fact, the value of zi is allowed to decay gradually from one to
zero in eight quarters. In the empirical study, the rate of decay was
chosen to be consistent with the estimates of the values of the lag
coefficients of the variables m_j in equation (1').— — APPENDIX
At any point in time, private market participants can look back and
estimate the coefficients of the policy reaction function (1') from past
data. To predict money growth, they must then forecast the discretionary
component of the policy stance. In the present model, it is assumed that
private market participants do not anticipate discretionary policy changes
but that their long—run expectations are revised once a policy change is
announced. The change in their expectations depends on the coefficient
of the variable zl, the magnitude of which depends on the effectiveness
of past policy changes.





which is used to predict money growth, the variable zi enters, but in a
modified form denoted by z2. The variable z2 takes the value of zero up
to the period when the policy change is announced; then, like z1, it
takes a value of one when the policy change is announced, after which z2
decays gradually.
Eight monetary stabilization programs were identified during the
period 1955—81 (second quarter) with the following initial impact periods:
the second quarter of 1956, the first quarter of 1962, the fourth quarter
of 1965, the second quarter of 1972, the fourth quarter of 1972, the
second quarter of 1973, the third quarter of 1979, and the first quarter
of 1981. The two programs with initial impact in the second quarter of
1972 and the fourth quarter of 1972 were given an intensity that was one— 34- APPENDIX
half that of the other programs. Following the rules explained above, z1
and Z2 were given the values presented in Table 3.





1 2 3 4 Year 1 2 3 4
1955 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1956 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.010 0.9 0.8
1957 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
1958 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
1959 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1960 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1961 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1962 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7
1963 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
1964 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1965 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
1966 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
1967 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1
1968 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1969 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1970 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1971 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1972 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.9
1973 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.4 1.3
1974 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.5
1975 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
1976 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1977 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1978 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1979 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.9
1980 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
1981 - 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.235 — J.R.Artus
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FOOTNOTES
1
This view was developed, in particular, by Lucas((1972), (1975)),
Sargent and al1ace (1975), and Barro (1978).
2
Most of the labor contracts in Germany are fora period of a year
and require a few months of negotiationsso that the six—quarter period
chosen to evaluate the expected long—run rate of inflationseems adequate.
3
Lagged money growth rates are usually included in the policyreac—
tion function because they may contain informationon the normal behavior
of the authorities that cannot be readily derived fromthe way they react
to values assumed by specific target variables.
4
See the Appendix for a detailed explanationconcerning the use of
the zj variable in equation (1') and thecorresponding z2 variable in
equation (1).
5
For a discussion of these identification problems,see Germany and
Srivastava (1979) and Buiter (1980).
6
See Artus (1981, footnote 12, p. 508), for a discussion ofthe sign
of the coefficient of the expected long—run inflationterm.
7.
For the sake of convenience, the current balance variablesare
expressed as ratios of exports of goods and services overimports of
goods and services in logarithmic form.
8
An attempt was made in Artus (1981) to differentiatebetween these
two effects of the current balance byintroducing the change in the cur-
rent balance in the exchange rate equation. Thischange was viewed as a
proxy for unanticipated current balance develornents on thegrounds that— 37—
FOOTNOTES(Continued)
quarterly changes in the current balance are difficult to forecast. The
level of the current balance was then assumed to identify the effect of
the limited asset substitutability. However, in the empirical analysis,
the coefficient of the change in the current balance was found to be small
and not significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent significance
level, while the coefficient of the level of the current balance was found
to be large and significant. This result could be interpreted as suggest-
ing that either the limited—substitutability effect was the important one,
or that even the level of the current balance was difficult to anticipate
and came often as a "surprise." In the present study, the effect of the
change in the current balance was again found to be not significant, and
this variable was dropped from the exchange rate equation.
9
The sources of the data are described in Artus (1981, Appendix II).
10
The regression results indicated in Table 2 for equations (1'),
(3'), and (4') are those based on the full sample period extending to the
second quarter of 1981.
11
The standard error of the estimate is indicated in parentheses.
12
The expression statistically significant is used in this paper as
an abbreviation for "significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent
significance level."
13
A similar conclusion is reached in Branson (1980).
14 -
Theimplied elasticity of money with respect to the long—term
interest rate is 0.4.— 38—
FOOTNOTES(Continued)
15
The first half of 1981 was certainly influenced by many factors
other than the election of Ronald Reagan, including political problems
in Germany and the crisis in Poland.
16
The dummy variable for the oil embargo takes the value 0.5 in the
fourth quarter of 1973, 1.5 in the first quarter of 1974, —2 in the second
quarter of 1974, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable for the collapse
of the Herstaff bank takes the value 1 in the third quarter of 1974, —0.5
in the fourth quarter of 1974, —0.5 in the first quarter of 1975, and zero
otherwise. Finally, the dummy variable for the election of Ronald Reagan
takes the value 1 in the first two quarters of 1981 and zero otherwise.
17
In the simulation, the reduction in money growth in Germany is accom-
panied by a change in money growth anticipation in the first quarter due
to the effect of the dummy variable z2 (See Appendix for a description
of this variable.) That is the reduction in money growth is defined as
a major policy shift that is viewed as such by private market participants.
18
In the model, it is not possible to simulate the case where the
German monetary authorities stabilize the DM/$ exchange rate while other
industrial countries do not adopt any monetary response. In particular,
there is no equation in the model that would determine what would happen
to the exchange rates of other industrial countries in this case.— 39—
FOOTNOTES(Concluded)
19
In the simulation where the German monetary authorities and the
monetary authorities of other industrial countries reduce the rate of
money growth, the level of economic activity in other industrial coun-
tries is assumed to be reduced in proportion to the reduction in the
German level of economic activity.